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Abstract 
 
Purpose - This paper focused on the relationship between executive compensation 
and financial perfomance of commercial state owned corporations in the energy sector 
in Kenya 
Methodology -   This study adopted a cross - sectional research design. Secondary 
data on net income, total assets and executive compensation were extrated from the 
individual company published financial statements for a five year period 
Findings - The study finds weak negative relationship between executive 
compensation and financial performance. Regression analysis models infer that 38.9% 
and 45.2% of variations in financial performance of the commercial state owned firms 
is explained by variations in the firm size and by variations in both the firm size and 
the levels of executive compensation respectively. The study found that any unit 
increase in firm size has a commensurate decline in ROA for the firms to an extent of 
0.059 and a unit increase in executive compensation has a commensurate decline in 
ROA for the firms to an extent of 0.027. 
Implication – the findings imply that there is no increased value for higher executive 
compensation in the public sector corporations. Thus, Corporations boards should re 
evaluate the comensation to justify value for the executive pay levels. 
Value – It is recomended that there be harmonization and review of the executive 
renumeration  system  to  include  pay  for  performance  perks  and  to  rationalize 
productive capacity of assets acquired to ensure they are utlized in value creation. 
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Introduction 
 
Crystal (1991) observe that compensation paid to the top executives of corporations is 
a politically sensitive area with critics claiming that amounts paid to executives are 
too high. The levels of compensation in all countries have been rising dramatically 
over the past decades. Not only is it rising in absolute terms, but also in relative terms. 
Gabaix  and  Landier  (2008)  established  that  the  compensation  of  other  senior 
executives has risen more rapidly than that of rank and file workers but has not kept 
pace with CEO pay. A reason for these huge increases is a result of the addition of this 
risky  pay  which  necessitated  an  increase  in  compensation  of  the  risk  averse 
executives. 
 
 
Tosi, et al. (2000) opine that corporate governance scholars have long attempted to 
understand a myriad of factors that underpin executive compensation. The most 
popular stream of research based on agency theory suggests that the board of directors 
and performance based incentives are among the critical governance mechanisms that 
allow reducing opportunistic behavior of executives and aligning their interests with 
those of shareholders. 
 
Executive compensation (also executive pay), is financial compensation received by 
an officer of a firm. It is typically a mixture of salary, bonuses, shares of and/or call 
options on the company stock, benefits, and perquisites, ideally configured to take into 
account  government  regulations,  tax law,  the  desires  of the  organization  and  the 
executive, and rewards for performance (Maijoor & Vanstraelen, 2006). Bebchuk and 
Grinstein  (2005)  and  Murphy  (1999)  opine  that  executive  compensation  is  pay 
received by an officer of a firm, often as a mixture of salary, bonuses, and shares of 
and/or call options on the company stock, paid expenses (perks) or insurance. It refers 
to the benefits and remuneration accruing to top management of a corporation mostly 
the Board of Directors including the CEO. 
 
 
Financial performance on the other hand is a measure of the extent the corporation has 
attained its goals and objectives thereby meeting the needs of all stakeholders and 
specifically shareholders. Leah (2008) explain that financial performance refers to the 
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measurement of the results of a firm’s strategies, policies and operations in monetary 
terms. These results are reflected in the firm’s return on assets (ROA) and return on 
investments (ROI). Various researchers have used different measures to capture 
organizational performance including net income, Sales (Dollinger, 1984), Return on 
Investments (ROI), Return on sales (ROS), and a combination of ROI and ROS 
(Pegels and Yang, 2000), return on assets (ROA) (Birley and Wiersema, 2002) and 
market to book value of the equity as well as profitability and market share/ growth 
(Entrialgo, et al. 2000). 
 
 
Executive compensation and financial performance are perfectly correlated, but 
associative studies on executive compensation and performance have yielded mixed 
results.  For  instance,  Jensen  and  Murphy  (1990),  reported  that  there  is  little 
relationship between executive pay and company performance. Main et al (1996), 
Izan, Sidhu and Taylor (1998), and Benito and Conyon (1999) have confirmed these 
low   pay   performance   sensitivities   and   Lishenga   (2011)   observe   that   CEO 
remuneration is insensitive to firm performance. 
 
Tosi et al. (2000) observed a weak correlation between CEO pay and performance but 
a strong positive correlation with CEO pay and firm size. Conversely, Shah et al. 
(2006) found a positive relationship between total CEO compensation and firm 
performance and explain that CEO compensation is a function of performance 
measures, size and corporate governance variables. Similar positive relationship was 
found by Ozkan (2007) in UK, Aduda and Musyoka (2011), Ongore and K‘obonyo 
(2011) and Busaule (2014) in separate studies done Kenya, while in Sweden, Tariq 
(2010) established that compensation of the CEO is an increasing function of size of 
the firm and also growth of the company. 
These mixed findings globally and locally point to the reality that the studies have not 
exhaustively   explored   the   link   between   executive   compensation   and   firm 
performance. 
 
Research Objective 
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This study sought to establish the relationship between executive compensation and 
financial performance of commercial state owned corporations in the energy sector in 
Kenya. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
This study adopted a cross - sectional research design. This design is appropriate when 
data is gathered systematically over a period of time in order to answer a research 
question. The target population comprised of eight commercial state corporations in 
the Ministry of Energy as listed in appendix one. Due to the small size of the 
population, no sampling was done. The study relied on secondary data on firm 
performance and executive compensation. Data on net income, total assets and 
executive  compensation  were  extrated  from  the  individual  company  published 
financial statements for a five year period (2010 to 2014). The study applied the 
statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) to run the data for analysis. Specifically, 
multiple regression analysis and correlation analysis were conducted. 
 
 
Analytical Model 
 
The relationship was analyzed in a multivariate regression model of the form: 
Perf = f(EXREM, Size, Capital Structure) 
Perfjt = α + β1EXREMjt + β2SIZEjt+ β3CAPSTRjt................................3.1 
 
 
 
Where:  
 
Perfjt:              Performance – Return on Assets (net income/ Total assets) 
EXREMjt:       Executive Remuneration – Log of directors remuneration 
SIZEjt:            Firm Size – Log of firms total assets 
CAPSTRjt:     Capital Structure – debt equity ratio (Total debt/ Total equity) 
 
α:                    A constant 
 
β1, β2, β3:        Coefficients 
 
 
 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test the significance of the overall model 
at 95% level of confidence. Coefficient of correlation (r) was used to determine the 
magnitude of the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. 
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Coefficient of determination (r2) was used to show the percentage for which each 
independent variable and all independent variables combined explain the change in 
the dependent variable. 
 
 
 
 
Results and Discussions 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table  4.1  below  presents  the  descriptive  statisstics  for  the  study  variables.  As 
indicated, the mean return on assets for the corporations in the five year period was 
0.0764 with a standard deviation of 0.090. The ROA data set has a range from -0.177 
to 0.455 and the data has both a positive kurtosis and skewness at 8.138 and 1.309 
respectively. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 ROA EXECCOMP CAPSTR SIZE Valid N 
(listwise) 
N Statistic 40 40 40 40 40 
Minimum Statistic -.177 9.378 -4.660 15.985  
Maximum Statistic .455 13.157 7.579 19.819  
Mean Statistic .0764 10.649 .1494 17.747  
Std. 
 
Deviation 
 
Statistic 
 
.090 
 
.920 
 
1.513 
 
.934 
 
 
Skewness 
Statistic 1.309 1.387 2.125 .486  
Std. Error .374 .374 .374 .374  
 
Kurtosis 
Statistic 8.138 1.978 17.620 -.564  
Std. Error .733 .733 .733 .733  
 
 
Executive compensation and capital structure datasets both have positive skewness 
and positive Kurtosis over the years. The mean capital structure is at 0.1494 as the 
minimum is -4.66 and the maximum is 7.579. The mean levels of executive 
compensation transformed into natural logarithm is at 10.649 as the mimimum is at at 
9.378 and the maximum is at 13.157. The mean firm size in terms of natural log of 
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assets is 17.747 as the minimum is 15.985 and the maximum is 19.819. Size data set 
has positive skewness and a negative peakdeness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation Analysis 
 
Table  4.2  below  is  a  correlation  matrix  presenting  the  association  between  firm 
financial performance, executive compensation, capital structure and firm size. 
Table 4.2: Correlations 
 
 ROA EXECCOMP CAPSTR SIZE 
ROA 1    
EXECCOMP -.340* 1   
CAPSTR .060 -.271 1  
SIZE -.636** .107 -.098 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
As indicated in Table 4.2, there is a statistically significant weak negative association 
between executive compensation and performance of the commercial state owned 
corporations in the energy sector in Kenya ( r= -0.340). The table presents that there is 
a weak positive association between firm performance and capital structure (r = 0.060) 
which is not statistically significant. Also, a weak negative association is identified 
between executive compensation and capital structure (r = -0.271) which is not 
statistically significant. 
 
The correlation analyses results infer a strong negative association between firm size 
and firm performance (r = -0.636) which is statistically significant. There is also a 
weak negative association between firm size and capital structure (r = -0.098) which is 
not statistically significant. There is also a weak positive association between firm size 
and executive compensation (r = 0.107). The relationship is however not statistically 
significant. This finding however rekindles Bizjak, Lemmon & Naveen (2008) and 
Fauklender  &  Yang  (2009)  propositions  that  firms  benchmark  their  pay  on  peer 
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groups to determine levels of executive salary , bonus or option rewards based on the 
industry and size and as such firm size is a determinant of executive pay. The findings 
conflict with Tosi et al. (2000) reporting that there is a weak correlation between CEO 
pay and performance and a strong positive correlation with CEO pay and size of the 
firm. 
 
 
The study conceptualized a multiple resgression model to test the relationship between 
executive compensation and firm financial performance as controlled by firm size and 
firm capital structure. The findings are summarized in tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 below. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Model Summary 
 
Mode 
 
l 
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
 
2 
.636a 
 
.693b 
.405 
 
.480 
.389 
 
.452 
.0706645 
 
.0669467 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SIZE 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), SIZE, EXECCOMP 
 
 
 
As presented in table 4.3 above, in model one, 38.9% of variations in financial 
performance of the commercial state owned firms is explained by variations in the 
firm size (Adjusted R2= 0.389). Model two presents that 45.2% of variations in 
financial performance of the firms is explained by variations in both the firm size and 
the levels of executive compensation. 
 
 
Table 4.4: ANOVAa 
 
Model Sum of 
 
Squares 
df Mean 
 
Square 
F Sig. 
 
 
1 
Regression .129 1 .129 25.879 .000b 
Residual .190 38 .005   
Total .319 39    
2 Regression .153 2 .077 17.086 .000c 
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 Residual .166 37 .004   
Total .319 39    
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), SIZE 
 
c. Predictors: (Constant), SIZE, EXECCOMP 
 
 
 
From the ANOVA statistics presented in table 4.4 above, the processed data, which 
are the population parameters, had a significance level of 0.000 for both models which 
shows that the data is ideal for making a conclusion on the population’s parameter. In 
model one, The F calculated at 5% level of significance was 25.879 which is greater 
that the critical F value of 3.72 which infer a significant relationship between firm size 
and firm performance. In Model two, the F calculated at 5% level of significance was 
17.086 which is greater that the critical F value of 3.72 which infer a significant 
relationship between firm size, executive compensation and firm performance. 
 
 
Table 4.5: Coefficientsa 
 
Model Unstandardized 
 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 
(Constant) 1.170 .215  5.435 .000 
SIZE -.062 .012 -.636 -5.087 .000 
 
 
 
2 
(Constant) 1.407 .228  6.163 .000 
SIZE -.059 .012 -.607 -5.092 .000 
EXECCO 
 
MP 
 
-.027 
 
.012 
 
-.275 
 
-2.310 
 
.027 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
 
 
Model one in table 4.5 above shows a statistically significant weak negative 
relationship between firm size (β=-0.062, t =-5.087, p<0.05) and firm financial 
performance which infers that amongst the commercial state owned corporations in 
the  energy  sector,  size  negatively  influence  financial  performance.  This  may  be 
70 
African development finance journal http://journals.uonbi.ac.ke/index.php/adfj 
October Vol1 No.1, 2017 PP 62-75 ISSN 2522-3186 
 
 
 
attributable to asset accumulation and idle productive capacity. From Model one, the 
study derives the following equation: 
Perfjt = 1.170 – 0.062SIZEjt 
 
 
 
This indicates that without providing for size, the constant firm performance is at a 
level of 1.17 in ROA. A unit increase in firm size has a commensurate decline in ROA 
for the firms to the extent of 0.062. This finding conflicts the general expectation that 
bigger firms perform better than smaller firms. 
 
 
Model  two  in   table  4.5   above  shows   statistically  significant   weak   negative 
relationships between firm size (β=-0.059, t =-5.092, p<0.05), executive compensation 
(β=-0.027, t =-2.310, p<0.05) and firm financial performance. From Model two, the 
study derives the following equation: 
Perfjt = 1.407 – 0.059SIZEjt – 0.027 EXREMjt 
 
This infers that without accounting for firm size and executive compensation, the 
constant levels of firm performance is represented by ROA of 1.407. Further, a unit 
increase in firm size has a commensurate decline in ROA for the firms to the extent of 
0.059 and a unit increase in executive compensation has a commensurate decline in 
 
ROA for the firms to the extent of 0.027. 
 
 
 
The finding of a negative effect of executive compensation levels on financial 
performance of firms is consistent with earlier findings by Ogoye (2002), Tariq (2010) 
and Aduda and Musyoka (2011) who found that the relationship between management 
compensation and firm performance was negative. These earlier studies however did 
not establish statistically significant relationships which the current study attests to. 
The findings are not consistent with the assertions of  Shah et al. (2006), Ozkan 
(2007), Ongore and K‘obonyo (2011) and Busaule (2014) who found a positive 
relationship between total CEO compensation and firm performance. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The study sought to determine the effect of executive compensation on financial 
performance of commercial state owned enterprises in the enery sector in Kenya. 
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Using the secondary data for he period 2010 to 2014, the correlation analysis results 
suggest statistically significant weak negative association between executive 
compensation and financial performance of the commercial state owned corporations 
in the energy sector in Kenya. The findings conflict with Tosi et al. (2000) arguments 
that there is a weak correlation between CEO pay and firm performance.  The analysis 
also confirms a statistically significant  strong negative association between firm size 
and financial performance of the commercial state owned corporations in the energy 
sector in Kenya. 
 
 
The findings infer  weak non statistically significant negative association between 
executive compensation and capital structure on one hand, and between firm size and 
capital structure on the other  hand.  The study also establishes a non statistically 
significant weak positive association between firm performance and capital structure. 
The weak positive association between firm size and executive compensation is a 
departure from Tosi et al. (2000) of a strong positive correlation with CEO pay and 
size of the firm. This finding should lead to a revisit of Bizjak, Lemmon & Naveen 
(2008) and Fauklender & Yang (2009) propositions that firms benchmark their pay on 
peer groups to determine levels of executive and as such, firm size is a determinant of 
executive pay. 
 
 
Regression analysis models suggest that 38.9% of variations in financial performance 
of the commercial state owned firms is explained by variations in the firm size and 
45.2% of variations in financial performance of the firms is explained by variations in 
both the firm size and the levels of executive compensation. The results suggest a 
weak negative relationship between firm size and firm financial performance which 
infers that amongst the commercial state owned corporations in the energy sector, size 
negatively influence financial performance. This may be attributable to asset 
accumulation and idle productive capacity. From the regression model, the study 
indicates that without providing for size, the constant firm performance is at a level of 
1.17 in ROA and a unit increase in firm size has a commensurate decline in ROA to 
the extent of 0.062. 
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Further regression analysis shows statistically significant weak negative relationships 
between firm size and financial performance on one hand and executive compensation 
and  firm  financial  performance  on  the  other  hand.  The  study  findings  infer  that 
without accounting for firm size and executive compensation, the constant levels of 
firm performance is represented by ROA of 1.407. Further, a unit increase in firm size 
has a commensurate decline in ROA for the firms to the extent of 0.059 and a unit 
increase in executive compensation has a commensurate decline in ROA for the firms 
to the extent of 0.027. The finding of a negative effect of executive compensation 
levels on financial performance of firms is consistent with earlier findings by Ogoye 
(2002), Tariq (2010) and Aduda and Musyoka (2011) who found that the relationship 
between management compensation and firm performance was negative though these 
earlier studies did not establish statistically significant relationships which the current 
study attests to. 
 
Recommendations 
 
In view of the research findings, a negative relationship is evident between executive 
compensation and financial performance which imply that there is no increased value 
for higher executive compensation in the public sector corporations. There should 
therefore be harmonization and review of the executive renumeration system in the 
public sector corporations to enhance performance. This should include pay for 
performance perks. 
 
 
The study documents a negative relationship between size and financial performance 
of the state owned commercial entreprises. This is an indication of excess asset 
capacity in the public sector organizations where there are chances of idle capacity. 
Efforts  should  be  directed  on  rationalization of productive  capacity of the  assets 
acquired to ensure they are utlized in value creation. 
 
 
This study recommends a similar study should be carried out in other government 
sectors to find out if the same findings will be obtained. The study suggests that 
further studies can be conducted on CEO and board’s turnover so as to establish how 
change in the boardroom affects public corporations financial performance. Future 
studies can also be done on the effect of CEO attributes on performance of such firms. 
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Such  studies  should  review  the  relationships  between  CEO  turnover  and  CEO 
 
compensation. 
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